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ROGUE DEBTORS AND UNANTICIPATED RISK 
S.I. STRONG* 
 
International investment always carries a certain amount of 
risk.  However, the current economic climate is particularly 
challenging as a result of various states’ aggressive and often non-
traditional investment policies1 as well as an increase in political 
instability in several regions.2 
Although investors are routinely required to calculate financial 
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1  See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11-13 (2010) (describing how sovereign 
wealth funds have become more aggressive in their “scope and form” over the 
last decade); Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: 
The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private 
Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425, 425-30 (2010) (arguing that states have 
become increasingly dependent on direct foreign investment); Clement N. 
Fondufe & Sara Mansuri, Doing Deals in Africa – Reflections on What is Different and 
What is Not, 14 BUS. L. INT’L 163, 173 (2013) (noting that in Africa “there is an 
uptick in the volume of capital markets work in the form of private and public 
offerings to raise funds for different investments”); David B. Wilkins & Mihaela 
Papa, The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite in the BRICS:  Implications for Good 
Governance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2013) (discussing investment patterns in 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). 
2  See Sophie Brown, Report:  Political Instability on the Rise, CNN.com (Dec. 12, 
2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/11/business/maplecroft-political-risk/; 
see also MAPLECROFT, POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS (2013), available at 
http://maplecroft.com/about/news/pra_2013.html (noting “extreme risk” of 
resource nationalism and expropriation in twenty-one nations); MULTILATERAL 
INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (MIGA), WORLD BANK GRP., 2012 WORLD 
INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL RISK 29 (2012) [hereinafter MIGA], available at 
http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf (discussing how and when 
countries become crisis-prone).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
09_STRONG (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:10 AM 
1140 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:4 
risks,3 “political risk events are not easily predictable.”4  In 
particular, it is extremely difficult to anticipate whether a 
particular nation will become a so-called “rogue debtor,” meaning 
a state that “take[s] purposeful advantage of [its] de facto 
immunity to walk away from legal and financial obligations.”5 
The concept of sovereign default is not new.6  However, the 
possibility of rogue debtors presents problems for both individual 
investors7 and “the integrity and efficiency of international capital 
markets” as a whole.8  One primary concern involves questions 
about how creditors can recoup or protect against losses in cases of 
sovereign default.9 
Traditionally, states, markets and investors have attempted to 
                                                     
3  See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Sovereign Arbitration, in SOVEREIGN DEBT 
MANAGEMENT ¶¶ 12.31, 12.43 (Rosa Lastra & Lee Buchheit eds., forthcoming 2014).   
4  MIGA, supra note 2, at 42. 
5  Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of 
Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 316 (2005).  See also MIGA, supra note 2, at 
33 (“Although defaults and expropriations rarely coincide in the same year, they 
are historically related in the sense that the same types of countries seem to 
engage in both over the long term.”).   
6  See Faisal Z. Ahmed et al., Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement of 
Sovereign Debt in Latin America, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 39 (2010) (discussing 
the history of sovereign default); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu 
Interpretation in the Elliott Case:  Brilliant Strategy But An Awful (Mid-Long Term) 
Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 56-58 (2011) (detailing the history of sovereign 
default in Latin America starting with Peru in 1985); Porzecanski, supra note 5, at 
316, 325 (discussing Argentina’s “unparalleled” history of sovereign default). 
7  See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign 
Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 131-32 (2012) (“From the perspective of outside 
investors, distinguishing a good from bad state can be difficult.”); Anna Gelpern, 
A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095, 1118 (2013) (noting 
that certain members of the creditor community framed some of Greece’s 
legislative efforts to address sovereign debt restructuring as “lawless” in nature); 
Olivares-Caminal, supra note 6, at 63 (discussing the risk associated with 
including a pari passu clause in a bond). 
8  Porzecanski, supra note 5, at 316.  To some extent, advanced economies 
may be at a higher risk for sovereign default than rising nations, although 
sovereign default is often analyzed in conjunction with the risk of expropriation, 
which is traditionally associated with rising nations.  See MIGA, supra note 2, at 
39. 
9  See MIGA, supra note 2, at 39 (“As the emerging economies have relied 
more on FDI as a substantial source of foreign currency in recent years, 
expropriation risk seems to be relatively higher.”); Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.29-
12.51, tbl. 12.1 (discussing sovereign default in the context of Abaclat v. Argentine 
Republic); Fondufe & Mansuri, supra note 1, at 165 (arguing that “we are 
witnessing a rush by foreign investors to bid for opportunities in the most 
lucrative industries” in Africa); Olivares-Caminal, supra note 6, at 60-63 
(discussing sovereign default in Argentina).  
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manage risk through regulation, insurance and private contract.10  
However, conventional forms of regulation are problematic in the 
international context because of the absence of single political actor 
that can address wrongful behavior and associated legal injuries in 
a comprehensive manner.11  Contract and insurance-based 
remedies can be difficult or expensive to obtain because sovereign 
default tends to be associated with “idiosyncratic economic 
shocks” that are difficult to predict.12  All of these approaches also 
tend to be limited to cases where the possibility of sovereign 
default has been anticipated in advance.13 
However, there are other ways to address sovereign default.14  
One mechanism, known as “regulatory litigation,” may be 
particularly useful, since it focuses on unanticipated risk.15  
According to theorists, regulatory litigation allows both public and 
private actors to fill certain gaps in the relevant regulatory regime 
by using a “legal remedy or the settlement equivalent in order to 
influence future, risk-producing behaviors.”16  Although this 
device has been successful in cases involving corporate 
                                                     
10  See MIGA, supra note 2, at 37, 42 (discussing risk aversion in emerging 
economies); Iman Anabtawi & Stephen L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law 
Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 91 (2013) 
(discussing mitigation of risk in the financial context); Choi et al., supra note 7, at 
132 (discussing risk management in sovereign debt investments); Olivares-
Caminal, supra note 6, at 46-49, 62-63 (discussing use of pari passu clauses). 
11  See Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.52-12.56 (detailing the problems with 
establishing a single tribunal for investment claims); Richard A. Nagareda, 
Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) (“[N]o formal political state has authority of a scope 
commensurate with modern global business.  As a result, our world is one that 
virtually invites regulatory mismatches.”).   
12  MIGA, supra note 2, at 35 (citing Maya Eden et al., Sovereign Defaults and 
Expropriations:  Empirical Regularities (The World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 6218, 2012)). 
13  Some observers might suggest that Argentina should have fallen into that 
category.  See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 
2007) (recounting the history of Argentinian financial difficulties).  However, as 
the recent financial crisis shows, sometimes the signs of risk exist but are ignored 
until it is too late.  See Steve Charnovitz, Addressing Government Failure Through 
International Financial Law, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 743, 748 (2010). 
14  See Ahmed et al., supra note 6, at 40 (suggesting the use of sanctions, 
including litigation as a sanction). 
15  See Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 73, 113 (2011). 
16  See id.; see also John S. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking 
Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 344-45 (2010).   
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defendants,17 it has been largely ineffective in situations involving 
rogue debtors because of problems relating to the legal immunity 
of sovereigns and their assets.18  As a result, some commentators 
have suggested that interstate negotiation constitutes the best if not 
only realistic means of addressing unanticipated sovereign 
defaults.19 
However, another alternative may exist.  In the last few years, 
investors have been experimenting with the possibility of using 
investment arbitration to address defaults on sovereign bonds.20  
Although there is still some debate about whether sovereign debt 
qualifies as an “investment” under various international treaties,21 
investment arbitration avoids a number of problems associated 
with regulatory litigation while nevertheless retaining some of its 
benefits.  For example, states in investment arbitration are 
considered to have waived their immunity to suit.22  Furthermore, 
enforcement of awards arising out of investment arbitration is 
typically easier than enforcement of judgments arising out of 
national courts.23 
If investment arbitration is accepted as a regulatory mechanism 
similar to regulatory litigation, then investors may have found a 
workable solution to the problem of sovereign default.24  However, 
                                                     
17  See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:  PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 119 (2000) (“[M]any corporate representatives whom we 
interviewed said that the burst of new class litigation has caused them to review 
financial and employment practices.”). 
18  See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and 
Borrowing, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 73 (2010) (suggesting that laws relating 
to sovereign immunity prohibit the seizure of state property to satisfy a 
judgment); Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.05, 12.19; Gelpern, supra note 7, at 1097. 
19  See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 18, at 69.   
20  See id. at 86; Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.33-12.51.  
21  See Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.28-12.44. 
22  See id. ¶ 12.05; Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in 
International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 715 (2007). 
23  See Cross, supra note 3, ¶ 12.05. 
24  Although most commentators agree that international investment law 
operates as a regulatory mechanism, much of the analysis focuses on substantive 
issues, since that approach mimics conventional thinking regarding legislatively 
enacted regulation.  See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State 
Arbitration as Governance:  Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the 
Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 5, 
10 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2008); Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International 
Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New 
Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 80-81, 85 (2011); Gus Van Harten & 
Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/9
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regulatory litigation and arbitration are meant to operate as flexible 
responses to unforeseen events, and it is unclear how much 
flexibility is allowed in investment arbitration as either a 
procedural or substantive matter.25 
This sort of philosophical split was evident in the preliminary 
award on jurisdiction rendered by the arbitral tribunal in Abaclat v. 
Argentine Republic, the first investment proceeding to address a 
default on sovereign bonds.26  According to the claimants, “[t]he 
major threat to the efficiency of foreign debt restructuring [is] 
rogue debtors . . . .  Consequently, opening the door to ICSID 
arbitration would create a supplementary leverage against such 
rogue debtors and therefore be beneficial to the efficiency of 
foreign debt restructuring.”27  The majority agreed that there was a 
“need for certain adaptations to the standard ICSID arbitration 
procedure,” based on “the impossibility to anticipate all kinds of 
possible investments and disputes,” and therefore allowed the 
dispute to move forward to the merits phase.28  The Abaclat 
                                                     
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 124-27, 148 (2006).  However, the question here is 
whether a particular process, in this case investment arbitration, might also act in 
a regulatory manner.  See S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of “Regulatory 
Arbitration” – Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment 
Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. 259, 265 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Arbitration].  
This analysis is facilitated by the fact that contemporary commentators have 
expanded the definition of regulation to include regulatory activity undertaken by 
private actors and other decentralized entities.  See Colin Scott, Privatization and 
Regulatory Regimes, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 651, 653 (Michael 
Moran et al. eds., 2006). 
25  Compare José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 2 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 44 
(2009) (suggesting need for flexibility in treaty interpretation), with Leon E. 
Trakman, Foreign Direct Investment: Hazard or Opportunity? 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2009) (suggesting need for predictability in treaty interpretation).  See 
also Daniella Strik, Investment Protection of Sovereign Debt and its Implications on the 
Future of Investment Law in the EU, 29 J. INT’L ARB. 183, 189-90 (2012) (discussing 
possible precedential power of Abaclat v. Argentine Republic); Strong, Regulatory 
Arbitration, supra note 24, at 313-16 (discussing procedural and substantive 
uncertainty).  
26  See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter 
Abaclat Award], available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf; Abaclat 
(formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter 
Abaclat Dissent], available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.pdf. 
27  Abaclat Award, supra note 26, ¶ 514. 
28  Id. ¶ 519.  
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approach has subsequently been adopted, at least to a limited 
extent, by other arbitral tribunals facing defaults on sovereign 
bonds.29 
The dissent in Abaclat strongly opposed any efforts “to create . . 
. leverage over sovereign debtors” through the use of “the 
tribunal’s gap-filling powers under article 44 of the ICSID 
Convention,” since neither the ICSID Convention nor the financial 
markets had ever contemplated such an approach.30  The dissent 
also 
caution[ed] against the tendency of certain ICSID tribunals 
to consider any limitation on their jurisdiction . . . as an 
obstacle in the way of achieving the object and purpose of 
these treaties, which they interpret as being exclusively to 
afford maximum protection to investment, notwithstanding 
the legitimate interests of the host State.31 
The dissent’s concerns about the propriety of investment 
arbitration were not limited to a philosophical dispute about the 
flexibility of investment arbitration.  The dissent also had a very 
practical problem in mind, namely the possibility that an expansive 
approach to investment arbitration in this context would trigger a 
more general backlash against investment arbitration.32 
Concerns about a growing disenchantment with investment 
arbitration are not new.  As state respondents have come to realize 
that investment arbitration constitutes a regulatory mechanism 
with real teeth,33 some states have either withdrawn from or 
refused to enter into various investment treaties.34  However, this 
                                                     
29  See Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 12, 423 (Feb. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1276.pdf; Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.28-12.32. 
30  Abaclat Dissent, supra note 26, ¶ 265. 
31  Id. ¶ 272. 
32  See id.¶ 274. 
33  See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 
775, 843-44 (2012) (emphasizing investment arbitration’s increasingly significant 
role in the resolution of international disputes). 
34  See id. at 843-44; Luke Eric Peterson, In Policy Switch, Australia Disavows 
Need for Investor-State Arbitration Provisions in Trade and Investment Agreements, 
INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Apr. 14, 2012), 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110414; Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s 
Withdrawal from ICSID:  What it Does and Does Not Achieve, INVESTMENT TREATY 
NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-
withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/. 
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approach is both relatively extreme and relatively rare.  Instead, 
the real threat to the investment regime comes from more nuanced 
responses to the risk of broad financial exposure in investment 
arbitration. 
At this point, states appear to have devised three possible ways 
of minimizing the likelihood of being named as a respondent in an 
arbitral proceeding involving sovereign debt.  First, states may 
specifically exclude disputes involving sovereign debt from the 
scope of existing treaties or subject such matters to special 
treatment.35  A number of these clauses already exist, although no 
tribunal has yet addressed one of these provisions.36 
Analytically, this approach could generate a number of 
challenges.  On the one hand, states are entitled to limit the scope 
of the treaties into which they enter.  However, difficulties could 
arise if the exclusions conflicted with other principles of 
international law.37  Practical and jurisprudential problems could 
also arise if the state in question was seeking to amend the terms of 
an existing treaty, since it is often difficult to alter international 
agreements once they are in force.38 
Second, states could specifically exclude certain types of 
remedies, such as investment arbitration, from contracts associated 
with sovereign debt.39  The need for an express waiver may seem 
anomalous, since arbitration is a creature of consent and most 
sovereign loan agreements do not currently include an arbitration 
provision.40  However, investment arbitration involves a “standing 
offer” of arbitration from the state to all eligible investors pursuant 
to a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty or free trade 
agreement, which means that a qualified party can bring an 
investment proceeding even if the underlying contract does not 
                                                     
35  See Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.45-12.51. 
36  See id. ¶¶ 12.45-12.51, tbl. 12.1.  
37  See id. ¶¶ 12.45-12.51; S.I. Strong, Limits of Autonomy in International 
Investment Arbitration: Are Contractual Waivers of Mass Procedures Enforceable? in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION:  THE 
FORDHAM PAPERS 2013 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter 
Strong, Waiver] (discussing how waivers of investment arbitration might be 
treated under international law). 
38  See Strong, Waiver, supra note 37. 
39  See id. (discussing three ways states could attempt to limit liability in 
investment arbitration). 
40  See Cross, supra note 3, ¶ 12.02. 
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include an arbitration provision.41 
It is unknown whether any state has attempted to insert a 
waiver of investment arbitration in a sovereign loan agreement.  
However, an explicit waiver of investment arbitration was recently 
proposed by the Republic of Colombia in a model concession 
agreement,42 which suggests that similar language could be used in 
other contexts, including sovereign debt. 
No arbitral tribunal has yet considered the validity of a 
contractual waiver of investment arbitration, and very little 
commentary exists regarding the enforceability of such 
provisions.43  However, observers believe that these waivers would 
be extremely problematic, since states would be allowed “to reap 
the general benefits of signing investment treaties (in terms of 
reciprocity and reputation) without having to face up to the 
regulation and potential scrutiny that such treaties entail.”44 
Finally, states could include contractual restructuring clauses 
known as collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds so as 
to limit the possibility of holdout creditors bringing an investment 
action.45  Although no tribunal has yet been asked to consider these 
sorts of provisions in the context of sovereign debt, some states 
have already adopted these sorts of provisions as a precautionary 
measure.46 
                                                     
41  See id. ¶ 12.08, 12.15; Strong, Waiver, supra note 37.  
42  The language was subsequently removed following objection from the 
international community.  See Sebastian Perry, Colombia Drops Treaty Claim Waiver 
Provision, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32122/colombia-drops-treaty-
claim-waiver-provision/; S.I. Strong, Contractual Waivers of Investment Arbitration:  
Wa(i)ve of the Future? 29 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. (forthcoming 2014) 
[hereinafter Strong, Contractual Waivers] (on file with author). 
43  See Paul Michael Blyschak, State Consent, Investor Interests and the Future of 
Investment Arbitration:  Reanalyzing the Jurisdiction of Investor-State Tribunals in Hard 
Cases, 9 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 99, 127 (2009) (discussing paucity of 
authority relating to waiver); Ole Spiermann, Individual Rights, State Interests and 
the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction Under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB. 
INT’L 179, 183 (2004) (discussing the concept of waiver of investment arbitration); 
Strong, Contractual Waivers, supra note 42 (analyzing issues relating to waiver of 
investment arbitration); Strong, Waiver, supra note 37 (discussing waiver in the 
context of class or mass claims).   
44  Blyschak, supra note 43, at 148 (citation omitted). 
45  See Waibel, supra note 22, at 713, 735-38. 
46  See Cross, supra note 3, ¶ 12.33 (discussing a Greek law that retroactively 
inserted collective-action clauses into Greek sovereign debt instruments that could 
effectively bar sovereign debt claims of the type seen in Abaclat). 
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As the preceding suggests, questions relating to sovereign debt 
are extremely complicated, and it is impossible to address all 
relevant issues in an Essay of this magnitude.  However, it is clear 
that the international legal community has much to consider in the 
coming years.  Not only will tribunals have to parse through the 
precise language of the relevant treaties and contracts, they may 
also need to consider important policy issues such as who should 
bear the burden of the risk of loss.47  On the one hand, many 
investors are relatively sophisticated and should perhaps be 
considered to be on notice of the possibility of rogue debtors.48  
Certainly the recent trend toward including sovereign default as an 
insurable political risk suggests that sovereign insolvency should 
no longer be considered an unanticipated event.49  On the other 
hand, sovereign default remains a largely random occurrence, and 
may not possible for investors or insurers to protect themselves 
properly against such scenarios.  Furthermore, it may not be just or 
economically prudent to allow states to act in bad faith, given the 
effect such behavior has on global capital markets.50 
When considering these issues, it may be useful to consider 
research on regulatory litigation that discusses who is best placed 
to guard against particular sorts of risks.51  Although such analyses 
are beyond the scope of the current Essay, they would likely shed a 
great deal of light on what is an extremely important issue in 
international legal and business circles.52 
 
                                                     
47  See Abaclat Dissent, supra note 26, ¶ 270. 
48  See Abaclat Award, supra note 26, ¶ 461. 
49  See MIGA, supra note 2, at 46-47 (discussing empirical evidence concerning 
political risk calculation). 
50  See Blyschak, supra note 43, at 148 (discussing effect of sovereign default 
on international investment). 
51  See S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. 
Class Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 948-53 (2012) 
(considering how regulatory litigation operates in different regions). 
52  See Waibel, supra note 22, at 757-89 (noting the importance of sovereign 
default issues to global economy). 
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